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Abstract This paper investigates the economic impact and strategies of
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), Internet actors that reduce the ca-
pacity needs in the backbone network and improve the quality perceived
by users. We consider so-called push and pull models where the traffic is
paid by the sender or the receiver, respectively, as well as the situation
where the CDN is (vertically) integrated to, i.e., owned by, an Internet
Service Provider (ISP). We then discuss the implication of CDNs into
the network neutrality debate, another issue forgotten by researchers and
regulators.
1 Introduction
Content delivery networks (CDNs) are large distributed systems of servers de-
ployed within the Internet, aimed at putting data closer to end users to offer
better quality of service (QoS) and availability [3]. The role of CDNs is to produce
the highest performance for content accessed by users, some typically demanding
applications being video delivery or gaming. They are therefore of interest for
content/service providers, but also for network providers since reducing the load
(congestion) on the network: the most popular pieces of content, being stored at
the edge of the network, do not need to be downloaded from their source upon
each request.
But the telecommunications economics literature barely addresses the role of
CDNs, although they have become major actors of the Internet. While there has
been a huge amount of work on CDNs from a technical point of view, the litera-
ture on the economics of CDNs is more limited. Existing works focus on the op-
timal pricing strategies of CDNs [8], or discuss if and how different CDNs within
a network should cooperate when setting their caching strategies [1,4,5,7,9]. But
the interactions between CDNs, ISPs, and CPs, have received little attention,
while they have a major impact all the different actors.
This paper is a first step in the direction of modeling and analyzing the re-
lations between CDNs and other Internet actors:
• We extend a previous model of ISP competition by including CDNs into the
picture, to study how they interact and what their best strategies are.
• We consider both the so-called pull model – where the ISP requesting content
has to pay the ISP hosting it – and the push model – where the transfer fee is paid
by the ISP hosting content to the one hosting end users; in addition the CDN
can be an independent entity or be owned and managed by an ISP. For each case,
we illustrate the impact of CDNs on ISPs’ revenues and on fairness between CPs.
•We then discuss the impact of CDNs on the network neutrality debate [10,11,12],
in which CDNs have also barely been addressed although they reduce traffic tran-
sit, thereby addressing in part the concerns that ISPs express in the debate.
2 Model
Extending the model in [6], we consider two ISPs (A and B), in competition for
end users. We assume a continuum of content, whose total mass normalized to
1 represents the total volume downloaded per time unit (i.e., the mass of each
piece of content is proportional to its popularity). Let x (resp., 1 − x) be the
proportion of content that is directly connected to the Internet through A (resp.,
B).
At each ISP, we can have a CDN, indexed by the name of its host ISP,
caching some of the content rooted at the other ISP to improve QoS and avoid
potential transfer fees between ISPs. Each CDN can be an independent actor
(ex: Akamai), or a service implemented by the hosting ISP (the CDN is then
said vertically integrated).
Figure 1 represents the actors and their economic relations. Users are treated
too as a continuum (individuals having a negligible impact) of total mass 1. The
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Figure 1. Relations between users, ISPs, and CPs
price pA (resp. pB) is the flat-rate subscription fee of ISP A (resp. B), and t is
a unit price for the traffic transferred between ISPs: t = 0 corresponds to the
classical peering agreement with no fee, while t 6= 0 means a paid transit.
Finally, only a portion of the downloaded content is cached by the CDNs, we
denote those quantities by yA ≤ 1− x at CDN A and yB ≤ x at CDN B.
Users’ choice of ISP (if any) is through a standard attraction model [2]: the
proportion of users choosing Option i ∈ {A,B, 0} –0 meaning no subscription–
is
σi(pA, pB)
def
=
(xi/pi)
α
(xA/pA)α + (xB/pB)α + 1/pα0
, (1)
where α > 0 is a sensitivity parameter, p0 represents the cost of not benefitting
from any content, and xi is the average perceived quality with ISP i ∈ {A,B}.
Content is reachable with high quality γ > 1 (from the local ISP or its host
CDN) or low quality 1 (from the distant ISP), yielding
xA = 1 + (x+ yA)(γ − 1); xB = 1 + (1− x+ yB)(γ − 1).
Each ISP i ∈ {A,B} focuses on net benefits, stemming from:
1) end-users subscriptions, the corresponding incomes being proportional to the
market share σi and the price pi;
2) the potential gains/costs from hosting a CDN:
– if the CDN is an independent actor (Akamai for instance), we assume the
CDN pays a per-unit-of-volume fee r to the ISP for delivering content from
the CDN cache servers to the ISP users.
– If the CDN role is managed by the ISP itself (something increasingly hap-
pening), r is the per-unit-of-volume revenue the ISP gets from remote CPs
for serving as a CDN. We also add a storing cost ci depending on yi, that
can be considered convex since the most popular contents will be cached in
priority.
3) And the potential transit fees between ISPs: content associated to ISP A
(resp. B) and transferred to B (resp. A) being proportional to x − yB (resp.
1 − x − yA) and to ISP B (resp. A) market share, the net (possibly negative)
amount ∆A,B of traffic from A to B is
∆A,B = (x− yB)σB(pA, pB)− (1− x− yA)σA(pA, pB).
– In the Pull model, the transfer fee is paid by the ISP hosting end users to
the one hosting content, i.e., the service is asked by end users. Let t be the
per-unit-of-volume price. This leads to a revenue t∆A,B for A, from B (and
an equal cost for B).
– Push model : the transfer fee is paid by the ISP hosting content to the one
hosting end users, i.e., the service is asked by content providers. The same
type of expression can be used with t < 0.
Regrouping, the ISP utilities per time unit are:
UA(pA, pB) = σA(pA, pB)pA + t∆A,B + ryA − cA(yA), (2)
UB(pA, pB) = σB(pA, pB)pB − t∆A,B + ryB − cB(yB).
We neglect the transfer cost of files from (remote) content providers to CDNs,
since that transfer is done only once.
3 How much content to cache?
We focus here on the amount of cached content that benefits the most to the
ISP hosting the CDN.
3.1 Pull model and independent CDN
From (2), if ISP i hosts a CDN increasing its cached content: i) ISP i attracts
more users because providing a better QoS (i.e., σi increases), ii) ISP i gains
more from the CDN (ryi increases with yi), iii) ISP i pays less for transit because
“pulling” less traffic. Ui thus increases with yi, ISPs should then let CDNs cache
as much content as possible.
3.2 Push model and independent CDN
Now the ISP still gains from CDN payments and increased attractiveness to
users, but loses from transfer fees since its competitor will have to “push” less
traffic. Figure 2(a) shows the values of UA when yA (∈ [0, 1−x]) varies, for three
values of r and with α = 1.5, x = 0.6, t = −1, yB = 0.3, γ = 1.5, p0 = 1,
pA = 1.3, pB = 1.7. Note that cA = cB = 0, since the storage cost is borne by
the CDN. Depending on the parameters, it can be optimal to cache nothing, the
whole content, or an intermediate amount, but we expect the optimal cached
amount to increase with r, because the ISP’s revenue from the CDN increases.
3.3 Pull model and integrated CDN
We take here the same values as for Figure 2(a), except that now t = 1 (pull
model) and that the ISP bears storage costs, of the form cA(yA) = (yA)
3/2.
Because of that cost, we end up too with a trade-off. Figure 2(b) displays UA
in terms of yA (∈ [0, 1 − x]). Note here that because c
′
A(0) = 0, the derivative
of the utility is positive at 0 (the other effects improve revenue), hence there
are always incentives to cache some content. Again, when r is large enough, it
becomes beneficial to cache all content.
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Figure 2. ISP A revenue versus cached amount yA
3.4 Push model and integrated CDN
With the same set of values as for Figure 2(a), but with the storage costs
cA(yA) = (yA)
3/2, we studied the revenue UA when yA varies. The curves have
a shape similar to those of Figure 2(a), we omit them due to space constraints.
Even in the push model, an ISP can have an interest in using an integrated CDN
if r is large enough.
3.5 Caching and its impact on revenues
Figure 3 (top) plots the optimal cached amount yA and the corresponding utility
UA in terms of x, for each of the four situations, adding the curve of UA when
no CDN exists. Note it is not relevant to compare the numerical values between
integrated and independent: r is taken the same (a cost cA is added to the
integrated case), but it represents a price paid by the CDN in the independent
case and a price paid by CPs in the integrated case. Remark in Figure 3 (top)
that for the push/integrated case, yA is 0 or close to 0. In the push/independent
case, caching a non-negligible proportion is better for small x but the optimal
cached part quickly goes to 0 as x increases. As seen before, all B content (i.e.,
yA = 1−x) is cached in the pull/independent case. For the pull/integrated model
the optimal yA increases with x when ya < 1−x. Note that UA increases with x
in the pull cases, but the trend is to decrease in the push ones, suggesting there
is no interest for ISPs to attract CPs for the latter. Moreover the no-CDN curve
is very close to the integrated one in the push case, because yoptA is close to 0.
Caching does not yield a large revenue improvement in the pull/integrated case
either (while it does for the independent case), but the gain can be significant
with different parameters. Figure 3 (bottom) displays the same metrics, but when
the price r varies. For small values of r, in both push cases there is no incentive
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Figure 3. ISP A optimal yA and utility UA
to cache content, because gains are not sufficient, but above a threshold caching
becomes beneficial. The revenue logically increases in r too (in cases with CDN).
4 Fairness concerns
We now focus on the impact of CDNs on CPs: Is there a difference of treatment
among CPs according to the ISP they are attached to? To answer, we use the
(aggregated) perceived quality Qi of content associated to ISP i, that is γ for
the customers of ISP i and for those of j 6= i if the content is cached in j’s CDN,
and 1 otherwise. This gives:
QA = γσA + γσByB/x+ σB(1− yB/x)
QB = γσB + γσAyA/(1− x) + σA(1− yA/(1− x)).
Note that for any set of parameters, quality does not depend on the type of model
(push/pull, integrated or not). Taking the values (when fixed) of Section 3.2
(adding yA = 0.2), we display QA and QB in Figure 4 when x and yA vary.
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Figure 4. Content quality depending on host ISP
We observe a difference of treatment depending on the proportion of content
hosted by ISPs (note that we have considered heterogeneous parameters). When
x is small here, content hosted in B perceived better (because almost all content
of B is cached in A, the yi being fixed, while after some point the quality in A
becomes better. This illustrates the impact of CDNs on perceived quality, and
that CPs may be disadvantaged if associated with a given ISP. Figure 4 (right)
shows that as the cached amount in A increases, the quality QB of content in B
increases, but QA also increases (even if to a lesser extent), because σA increases.
5 Discussion: CDN and neutrality
The question of how CDNs impact the network neutrality debate hasn’t been
addressed much, but introducing them into the picture reshapes the economic
relationships between actors. Several remarks on that matter can be made from
our model:
1) For the pull model, the ISP has interest in accepting the operation of an
external CDN, even without charging it. In all other cases, there are conditions
on the set of parameters for this to occur, but the ISP often has an interest in
hosting a CDN (integrated or not).
2) Hosting a CDN induces less traffic within the network, thus reduces the
pressure to increase capacities.
3) The CDN operation fees are paid by CPs (to improve their QoS), which
somehow is a shift in payment with respect to the side payments requested by
ISPs in the neutrality debate. But this fee can hurt innovation exactly as side
payments would: can regulators accept that and still prevent ISPs from imposing
side payments?
4) Only the most frequently downloaded content is cached by CDNs. If the
service is proposed to all (distant) CPs, this makes a differentiation between
CPs, which is in a sense against the neutrality principle, because packets are
not treated the same. One can also argue that it makes a difference of treatment
between local and distant CPs. In any case, the CDN activity requires attention,
and its conformity depends on the definition of neutrality.
5) The case r = 0 (no payment) would not create any neutrality problem.
But as we have seen, this is acceptable for the ISP only for the pull model with
an external CDN.
6) But we assumed here that CPs always prefer to use the CDN services,
something to be further studied.
We believe that this work highlights the need for CDNs economic modeling
in the Internet and for a deeper investigation of their impact on actors, fairness,
and neutrality.
6 Conclusions and perspectives
This paper is a first step in the modeling and analysis of CDNs’ economics, in
interaction with end users, content providers and ISPs, in order to start dis-
cussing their influence into the network neutrality debate. We have presented
several situations, depending on whether the CDN is vertically integrated with
the ISP or not, combined with the so-called push and pull models, where the
traffic is paid by the sender or the receiver respectively. We have determined
how the CDN can compute the optimal amount data to be cached in each situ-
ation (which of course depends on the selected parameters) and the impact on
revenue. The impact on the fairness in terms of treatment between the different
content providers is then described.
We observed that revenue-oriented CDNs may treat content providers differ-
ently, which could go against principles of neutrality and hurt innovation. Again,
conclusions are case dependent, since different parameter choices can lead to dif-
ferent conclusions.
As extensions of the work, we would like to investigate the viability of CDNs’
business in neutral and non-neutral contexts, and to study the case of more
complex topologies involving more ISPs, CDNs in competition, as well as more
content providers. The case when ISPs pay for caching will also deserve attention.
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